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Abstract
In this paper we present a Mobile Operator endorsed
authentication and payment platform for the consump-
tion of web services by a Mobile Station. We propose
a protocol where the Mobile Operator plays the role of
Trusted Third Party to issue authentication and au-
thenticated payment authorisation tokens to facilitate a
transaction between a Mobile Station and a Web Service
Provider. We consider the structure and syntax of these
tokens to minimise service latency, and provide security
services to protect against the threat model. To validate
our proposal we have developed code to create aWeb Ser-
vice test scenario utilising readily available J2ME, Java
Card, J2SEand J2EEplatforms,WebServices tools from
Apache, the KToolBar emulator from Sun, and a Gem-
plus Java Card.
1. Introduction
This paper proposes a protocol for authentication
and payment between a consumer and a Web Service
Provider that builds upon the Mobile Operator rela-
tionship with the mobile subscriber. The protocol en-
ables the Mobile Operator to provide a secure and
trusted payment and authentication environment, al-
lowing Web Service Providers to gain commercial ac-
cess to the Mobile Operator’s subscriber base.
But why should the Mobile Operator wish to en-
courage such access? It has long been noted [4] that
distribution structures, and specifically the consumer
facing retailing function, evolve as industries mature.
Many consider traditional Mobile Operators to be at
the early stages of their development as retailers of dig-
ital content. The current distribution structures typi-
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fied by Vodafone Live! from Vodafone, T Zones from
T-Mobile, and e-mocion from Telefonica are examples
of “one stop shops”. Vertically integrated, they source,
market and advertise a range of goods to consumers
who are encouraged to repeat purchase. They may be
considered as analogous to a Department Store on the
high street. The typical High Street has evolved, how-
ever, and in many cases is complemented (if not re-
placed) by the Shopping Mall. Comprising both De-
partment Stores and specialist retailers the operator
of the Shopping Mall benefits from a large number of
customers (i.e. traffic volume) whilst remaining inde-
pendent from the cost and management of the retailed
stock. As the commercial benefit from provision of dig-
ital content to mobile consumers transitions from pro-
motional to revenue generating, the “Shopping Mall”
concept of digital content retailing may become an at-
tractive model for the traditional Mobile Operator.
This paper focuses on two critical enablers facilitat-
ing the transition of Mobile Operator digital content
retailing functions to a services orientated architecture
[10], namely authentication and payment.
2. The web service requirement
Our proposal concerns three main actors; the Con-
sumer, the Mobile Operator and the Service Provider.
The consumer is assumed to access the scheme via a
bandwidth-constrained Mobile Station, comprising mo-
bile device and service-enabling SIM card connected
to a GPRS or UMTS mobile network. Service latency
should be minimal without the need to purchase new
equipment, and the “purchase experience” should be
consistent across all services, irrespective of the ac-
tual service provider. Payment for services should be
through the normal mechanisms provided by the Mo-
bile Operator, with anonymity an optional consumer
requirement. Service consumption is ad hoc, irregular
and transitory in duration.
The Mobile Operator is assumed to require max-
imum distribution for the available services at low-
est cost. Consumers and Service Providers should be
capable of dynamically and asynchronously entering
and leaving the system. The service must be termi-
nal vendor independent and capable of being set-up us-
ing Over The Air (OTA) techniques. Finally, the Ser-
vice Provider, who will not want to develop new busi-
ness processes solely for Mobile Operators, must inter-
face to the system using standard internet protocols.
We base our proposed scheme on the assumption
that these requirements are met with a Web Services
architecture, where:
• the consumer service endpoint is an OTA installed
application running on a mobile device that uses
the SIM card as its security element,
• the service content is provided by a Web Services
Provider in accordance with internet standards,
and
• the Mobile Operator provides service discov-
ery, content delivery, authentication and pay-
ment services to both consumers and Web Service
Providers.
3. The proposed scheme
In our proposal the Mobile Operator is a trusted
third party acting as an intermediary betweenWeb Ser-
vice Providers and each of the Web Service consumers
(Mobile Stations) served by the Mobile Operator. The
Mobile Operator provides authentication and payment
authorisation tokens, that are exchanged by the Mo-
bile Station for the subsequent consumption of Web
Services provided by Web Service Providers that are
listed by the Mobile Operator.
The Mobile Station is assumed to implement a Secu-
rityAgent function — an example of which is presented
in [8]. The Security Agent comprises a device executed
MIDlet application for I/O and computationally inten-
sive operations, together with a tamper-resistant mod-
ule (e.g. Trusted Programme Module (TPM) and/or
SIM card) executed application for secure storage and
cryptographic processing. The Mobile Operator is as-
sumed to implement a Token Distribution Centre com-
prising Authentication and Payment Servers working
in consert with the Billing System.
We adopt a push-based model [5] to exchange au-
thentication and payment authorisation tokens be-
tween the scheme entities. Tokens are pushed from the
Mobile Operator’s Token Distribution Centre to the
Mobile Station, for local storage. This allows a shop-
ping basket of services to be assembled before the to-
Figure 1. Scheme Description
kens are subsequently pushed from the Mobile Station
to the Web Service Providers in exchange for their ser-
vices.
By storing the tokens on the Mobile Station we sim-
ulate a familiar shopping behaviour. We allow the con-
sumer to pause (i.e. service interuption) between the
phases of entering the Shopping Mall (i.e. authentica-
tion), browsing and selecting the goods (web service se-
lection) and proceeding to the checkout (i.e. payment)
as indicated in the shaded areas of Figure 1. It is con-
sidered good practice [2] to design mobile applications
so that they can be interrupted by the user. The scheme
is summarised with reference to Figure 1.
1. The Security Agent of the Mobile Station and the
Mobile Operator perform a mutual authentication
process, using the technique described in [8]. This
initiates a secure session, including the agreement
of cryptographic algorithms and the establishment
of a pair of authenticated shared secret keys, one
for encryption (CK) and the other for MAC gen-
eration (IK).
2. The Mobile Station application requests a link to
the Mobile Operator’s Token Distribution Cen-
tre. A mobile identifier used solely for web ser-
vices is provided, and an authentication token re-
quested. For improved privacy, this web services
mobile identifier can be encrypted using the con-
fidentiality key CK if required.
3. The Authentication Server issues an authentica-
tion token to the Mobile Station.
4. The Mobile Station application browses the web
services offered by the Mobile Operator. Upon ser-
vice selection, the authentication token is provided
to the Web Service Provider as proof of identity.
5. The Web Service Provider responds by informing
the Mobile Operator’s Payment Token Server of
the price and other contractual terms of the ser-
vice requested by the Mobile Station.
6. Once service selection is completed, the Mobile
Station requests checkout.
7. The Payment Token Server responds by issuing a
single payment token to the Mobile Station for all
the selected services.
8. To initiate service consumption the Mobile Sta-
tion pushes the one-time-use payment token to the
appropriate Web Service Provider(s). To avoid in-
formation leakage between Web Service Providers,
the Mobile Station can request a Payment token
for each service selected. In this instance service
consumption is initiated by the Mobile Station
pushing the one-time-use payment token only to
the specific Web Service Provider.
9. The Web Service(s) responds by supplying the re-
quested service to the Mobile Station via the Mo-
bile Operator. If required the service may be en-
crypted using CK to provide confidentiality ser-
vices between the Mobile Operator and the Mo-
bile Station.
10. Proof of delivery notification is provided by the
Mobile Station to the Billing System, and the se-
cure session is released.
11. Financial settlement request is made by the Ser-
vice Provider to the Mobile Operator, as deter-
mined by their commercial agreement.
12. Settlement between Mobile Operator and Web
Service provider is made either on a per transac-
tion or per time period basis. Settlement between
Mobile Station and Mobile Operator can either be
on a prepay basis, occurring when the payment to-
ken is issued in step 7 above, or upon receipt of
proof-of-delivery.
4. Implementation options
Web Services are defined [13] as software systems
that support interoperable network interactions. They
allow implementation of a service-orientated architec-
ture incorporating the entities of Service Provider, Ser-
vice Consumer and Service Registry. For information to
be moved around the network it must be packaged in a
format that is understood by these entities. The Simple
Object Access Protocol, (SOAP) [13] is the standard-
ised packaging protocol currently utilised for Web Ser-
vices. SOAP supports information exchanges by speci-
fying a way to structure XML messages.
As in any open network environment, these ex-
changes are exposed to security threats of message leak-
age, tampering and vandalism. We propose protocol
and token implementation options that are designed to
resist masquerading, message tampering, replay, and
denial of service attacks. Further, as the characteris-
tic of a Web Service is a response to a message, per-
ceived service quality is also dependent on latency be-
tween message and response. We therefore also con-
sider the implementation options that affect this.
We present both specific protocol exchanges and the
structure and syntax of the authentication and pay-
ment tokens.
4.1. Prerequisites for protocol
Our protocol uses both symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic techniques to provide the authentication
and integrity services required.
We choose to use symmetric rather than asymmet-
ric cryptography for providing the security services be-
tween Mobile Station and Mobile Operator. Perfor-
mance is critical in a mobile system and overhead must
always be minimised wherever possible [1]. A long term
secret key KSC is shared by the Mobile Operator and
the Mobile Station’s SIM card. This is used as de-
scribed in [8] for mutual authentication and authen-
ticated key establishment.
By contrast we use asymmetric cryptography to pro-
vide the security services between the Mobile Operator
and the Web Service Provider. Unlike the one-to-one
and enduring relationship between Mobile Station and
Mobile Operator, our scheme assumes that a Web Ser-
vice Provider may have a transitory relationship with
multiple Mobile Operators. In this topology it is best to
avoid the necessity of establishing a long term shared
secret; we thus adopt an asymmetric cryptographic so-
lution for provision of security services. The Mobile Op-
erator generates asymmetric key pairs for the Authen-
tication Server and the Payment Server, and obtains
certificates CertOP AS and CertOP PS for the respec-
tive public keys from a Certification Authority. Like-
wise, the Web Service Provider generates a key pair for
its Web Service Server, and obtains certificate CertWS
for the public key. The private keys will be used for
digitally signing messages. Our protocol is based on
the assumption that the Web Service Provider has ac-
cess to a trusted copy of the public key of the Certifica-
tion Authority used to sign the Mobile Operator’s pub-
lic key certificates, and vice versa. We also assume that
the Mobile Operator’s Authentication Server certificate
CertOP AS and the Mobile Operator Payment Server
certificate CertOP PS are in a format processable by
the Web Service Provider, and that the Web Server
Provider certificate CertWS is in a format processable
by the Mobile Operator. It is further assumed that the
Web Service has access to the Mobile Operator’s certifi-
cates, prior to commencement of the protocol. In a mul-
tiple Mobile Operator topology the certificates for each
specific Mobile Operator may be accessed via the Mo-
bile Operator specific value of the SecurityDomain el-
ement of the authentication token as presented in ap-
pendix 1. The associated trust issues are outside the
scope of this paper.
The Mobile Station identifier iM is a unique identi-
fier assigned by the Mobile Operator, used specifically
for procuring web services and distinct from the IMSI.
Its broadcast must be minimised wherever possible to
maintain user privacy and reduce the threat of cloning.
Therefore iM is only transmitted once to identify the
Mobile Station to the Mobile Operator. Following au-
thentication, a temporary Mobile Station identifier iM ′
is used to identify the Mobile Station in all communica-
tions with the Web Service Provider. This ensures user
anonymity and reduces the risk of cloning. It is the Mo-
bile Operator’s responsibility to maintain the relation-
ship between iM and iM ′ .
4.2. Protocol
We describe the critical protocol exchanges to ad-
dress the threat model by considering the authentica-
tion, service selection and payment phases of the proto-
col. Our description assumes that an authenticated key
establishment process has taken place between the Mo-
bile Operator and the Security Agent of a Mobile Sta-
tion [8].
We adopt the following additional notation:
AS = Authentication Server
PS = Payment Server
MS = Mobile Station
WS = Web Service
S(D, sx) = Signature of data D using key sx
MACIK(D) = MAC on data D using key IK
SiM′ = SAML authentication assertion
PiM′ = authenticated payment authorisation
4.2.1. Authentication: Mobile Station requests
an authentication token. The Authentication phase
commences with the authenticated key establishment
process. The Mobile Station then requests an authen-
tication token from the Mobile Operator’s Authenti-
cation Server by sending its identity iM integrity pro-
tected with a MAC computed with the Mobile Opera-
tor and Security Agent shared secret integrity key IK.
MS → AS : iM‖MACIK(iM )
Successful verification of the MAC confirms that the
Mobile Station at the other end of the secure chan-
nel is the legitimate owner of the mobile identity iM .
Note that freshness is guaranteed by the fact that the
key IK used to generate the MAC is session-specific.
The Authentication Server generates a temporary mo-
bile identifier iM ′ and records the mapping between iM
and iM ′ . The server then creates a SAML authentica-
tion assertion SiM′ using the temporary Mobile Sta-
tion identifier iM ′ . This assertion is compliant with the
SAML [9] specification and confirms that the user was
authenticated at a specific time by the Mobile Oper-
ator’s Authentication Server. This is digitally signed
by the private key sOP AS corresponding to the pub-
lic key certificate CertOP AS to give the authentication
token SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS). The authentication token
is then integrity protected with a MAC computed us-
ing the shared secret IK and transferred to the Mobile
Station.
AS →MS : SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS)‖
MACIK(SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS))
After successful verification of the MAC by the
Security Agent using IK, the authentication token
SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS) is stored in persistent Mobile
Station memory.
4.2.2. Service Selection: Mobile Station re-
ceives payment token. The Mobile Station browses
the Mobile Operator’s selection of web services. Upon
service selection, the Mobile Station copies the au-
thentication token SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS) from per-
sistent memory and transfers it to the Web Service
Provider as proof of identity.
MS →WS : SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS)
The Web Service can determine the identity of the
Mobile Operator from the SecurityDomain element in
the AuthenticationAssertion contained within SiM′
(see Appendix 1). Assuming contractual terms have
been agreed with the specific Mobile Operator for pro-
vision of the requested service, then the Web Service
verifies the digital signature using the public key in
CertOP AS , which it is assumed that the Web Service
application has the means to verify. To verify the fresh-
ness of the authentication token, the web service appli-
cation checks the timestamp attribute IssueInstant
of element AuthenticationAssertion within SiM′ ,
and also retains a log of recently accepted tokens to
ensure that no token is accepted twice. Following suc-
cessful verification of the digital signature and fresh-
ness checks, the Web Service Provider responds by in-
forming the Mobile Operator’s Payment Token Server
of service identity, payment details and other contrac-
tual terms, Tws, requested by the authenticated entity
identified in authentication assertion SiM′ . The authen-
tication assertion and the terms of the selected service
are digitally signed using the Web Server’s private key
corresponding to the public key in CertWS , and are
transferred to the Mobile Operator’s Payment Server.
WS → PS : SiM′‖Tws‖S(SiM′‖Tws, sWS)‖CertWS
The Mobile Operator’s Payment Server verifies the
digital signature using the public key in CertWS . Fol-
lowing successful verification, the identity and contrac-
tual terms of the web service described in Tws, are
stored for subsequent checkout against the Mobile Sta-
tion identity iM . This occurs for every service selected
by the Mobile Station. Once service selection is com-
pleted, the Payment Server confirms the user’s credit
worthiness, reserves the total payment amount, and
creates a payment authorisation PiM′ for all selected
services. This is digitally signed using the Mobile Op-
erator’s private key corresponding to the public key
in CertOP PS , to yield the authenticated payment to-
ken PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS). The payment token is then
integrity protected with a MAC computed using the
shared secret IK, and transferred to the Mobile Sta-
tion.
PS →MS : PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS)‖
MACIK(PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS)
After successful verification of the MAC by the Se-
curity Agent using IK, the authenticated payment to-
ken PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS) is stored in persistent Mo-
bile Station memory by the Security Agent.
4.2.3. Payment: Mobile Station exchanges to-
ken for services. To initiate consumption of the
selected services, the Mobile Station copies from per-
sistent memory the authenticated payment token
PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS) and transfers it to the Web Ser-
vice Provider(s).
MS →WS : PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS)
The Web Service can determine the identity of the
Mobile Operator from the SecurityDomain element in
the AuthenticationAssertion contained within PiM′
(see Appendix 1). Assuming contractual terms have
been agreed with the specific Mobile Operator for pro-
vision of the requested service, then the Web Service
verifies the digital signature using the public key in
CertOP PS , which it is assumed that the Web Ser-
vice application has the means to verify. Replay at-
tacks are avoided by ensuring that payment tokens
are one-time-use only. Token freshness is confirmed
by the Web Service checking and logging the service
identity and the timestamp attribute IssueInstant in
AuthenticationAssertion. Following successful sig-
nature verification and token freshness tests the Web
Service Provider responds by supplying the service to
the Mobile Station.
4.3. Authentication & payment tokens
To maximise interoperability these tokens are de-
signed as XML documents. The SiM′ and PiM′ doc-
uments assert user-related facts about authentication
and payment authorisation respectively. For integrity,
source entity authentication and non-repudiation these
assertions are signed by the issuing authority, i.e.
the Mobile Operator. They must therefore include
an XML digital signature. Unfortunately the self de-
scribing, extensible and interoperable nature of XML
leads to redundancy and, as a consequence, poten-
tially increased latency in constrained-bandwidth net-
works. With web service performance measured in
throughput and latency, the use, structure and syn-
tax of the authentication SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS), and
payment PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS) tokens is a critical im-
plementation choice. We identify the following imple-
mentation objectives regarding the use and design of
authentication and payment tokens:
1. Minimise the transmission time for
SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS) and PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS)
over bandwidth-constrained networks. Recast-
ing the scheme of Figure 1 into a pull-based
model, where the Mobile Operator provides a full
proxy service on behalf of the mobile client, elim-
inates the need to both transmit the tokens
over the constrained bandwidth mobile net-
work and to store them locally in expensive
client memory. This option is, however, at the ex-
pense of more centralised application control by
the Mobile Operator.
2. Compress the XML documents SiM′ and PiM′ .
There exist various XML compression schemes
that exploit the tree structure of the language
and enable the removal of unnecessary white space
[6]. As document size and latency must be min-
imised in the proposed scheme, both the compres-
sion ratio and the total transfer time (including
time to compress, transmit and subsequently de-
compress) of the compressed document are criti-
cal metrics for the choice of compression engine.
Although compression potentially reduces mem-
ory requirements and latency, the compressed to-
kens are non-standard. This could lead to inter-
operability issues for the scheme, unless compres-
sion is only deployed over the bandwidth con-
strained link. Such an implementation would once
again be at the expense of more centralised ap-
plication control by the Mobile Network. It is
worth noting that such a Mobile Network spe-
cific XML compression technique, WBXML [15],
which employs a scheme whereby the most com-
mon occurring XML value is represented by the
smallest token, was omitted from version 2 of the
OMA DRM Rights Object Acquisition Protocol
[12] despite its inclusion in the earlier version 1
[11]. WBXML’s inability to compress binary data
such as signatures and certificates, and the inter-
operability concern, demonstrates the practical is-
sues surrounding the choice of implementing XML
compression for the tokens SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS)
and PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS). Adoption of a stan-
dard compression technique such as http deflate
is proposed as a reasonable compromise to min-
imise transmission latency whist ensuring maxi-
mum interoperability.
3. Optimally design the token syntax. The XML sig-
nature syntax standard is designed with a high
degree of extensibility and flexibility. To op-
timise performance of the proposed scheme,
it is possible to select an implementation of
SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS) and PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS)
that minimises size and latency whilst remain-
ing compliant to the standard to ensure inter-
operability. We propose the following implemen-
tation choices within the XML digital signature
[3].
(a) To adopt an enveloping XML Signature
structure where the authentication and pay-
ment tokens are child elements to the signa-
ture. This allows the Mobile Station to easily
access the token in the Object container el-
ement to confirm validity before invoking
expensive network resources.
(b) To reduce the size and the speed of the sign-
ing operation, each resource within the sig-
nature manifest of the SignedInfo element
is hashed, and the digital signature of the
hashed list then calculated.
(c) To protect against an attack that attempts to
substitute the Object element of token PiM′
and SiM′ the canonicalisation algorithm used
is referenced in CanonicalizationMethod.
(d) To relieve the limited processing power
Mobile Station of the computational ex-
pense of validating the digital signa-
tures, tokens SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS) and
PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS) are transmitted to
the Mobile Station via a secure, symmet-
ric integrity protected channel. Maximum in-
teroperability with web services, and the
requirement for Web Service Providers
to dynamically and asynchronously en-
ter and leave the system without the need
for complex secret key distribution struc-
tures, is achieved by using a digital signature,
not a message authentication code, in ele-
ment SignatureMethod.
(e) To prevent an attacker removing the asser-
tion and payment tokens from the Object
element, whilst retaining verification of the
digital signature, the Object ID URI is ref-
erenced in the Reference element.
(f) To reduce the size of the XML docu-
ments, the optional element KeyInfo
is excluded from the XML Signa-
ture structure. Key verification mater-
ial of tokens SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS) and
PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS) and the issue of trust
is left to the web service application. This
therefore assumes that the web service ap-
plication has access to the key verification
material. This assumption is valid if the au-
thentication assertion SiM′ is based on
SAML [9]. As such, the assertion will spec-
ify the identity of the authentication au-
thority (i.e. the Mobile Operator). As the
web service is listed by the Mobile Op-
erator, it is considered to be within the
Mobile Operator’s domain, and there-
fore trust is established prior to the re-
ceipt of the tokens SiM′‖S(SiM′ , sOP AS)
and PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS).
(g) To thwart any fraudulent attempt by the Mo-
bile Station to resubmit a payment token,
a timestamp attribute IssueInstant is in-
cluded in the AuthenticationAssertion
within SiM′ .The web service applica-
tion checks that no two payment tokens
from the same issuer are redeemed by the
same user with the same timestamp. The au-
thenticated payment token authorisation
PiM′‖S(PiM′ , sOP PS) contains the ini-
tial authentication assertion SiM′ . To reduce
the storage requirement for long term pro-
tection against Mobile Station initiated
replay attacks, an element specifying the to-
ken’s validity period may be added to the
authenticated payment token PiM′ . For sim-
plicity of presentation this element is not
presented in appendix 1.
(h) To avoid issuing a payment token for each
service requested, at the expense of informa-
tion leakage as noted above, a single payment
token is issued for a shopping basket of ser-
vices. The services to be purchased are
detailed in SignatureProperties. The se-
mantics of SignatureProperties are
application-specific, but would typically con-
tain the supplier identification, item speci-
fier or sku (stock keeping unit) and, perhaps,
the price.
This results in the representative syntax for a signed
authenticated Payment token Px, as presented in ap-
pendix 1.
4.4. Proof of concept prototype
To validate our proposal we have constructed the
Proof of Concept model of Figure 2, based on read-
ily available open source tools:
Figure 2. Proof of Concept Implementation
• A J2EE Servlet web application performs the Mo-
bile Operator function and is packaged as a WAR
file (Web Application Archive) for easy deploy-
ment on a Tomcat Apache Web Server.
• The Mobile Station comprises a mobile device and
a SIM card. A J2ME Client performs the mo-
bile device function and is emulated by the Wire-
less KToolbar [14] from Sun Microsystems, run-
ning our Security Agent MIDP 2.0 MIDlet on the
reference J2ME implementation. The SIM card
Security Agent function is provided by a Gem-
plus GemXpresso RAD 211 Java Card with crypto
package, connected to our demonstration environ-
ment via a USB card reader.
• A Web Service application is packaged as a WAR
file and deployed on the Tomcat Server and com-
municates with the Mobile Operator function us-
ing SOAP over http. We used the jax-rpc API to-
gether with tools from Apache Axis to create the
service WSDL and deploy the Web Service on a
Tomcat Server.
The demonstration environment of our proof of con-
cept model is implemented in J2SE. J2SE provides the
necessary Java Swing classes for monitoring the various
use case applications tested on our model. The model
is designed so that each phase of a specific use case is
initiated manually and monitored by visual feedback
through the use of J2SE’s GUI LayoutManager class
and ActionListener interface.
The test scenario is the implementation of a sim-
ulated football match, where the consumer selects the
specific match venue of interest via a mobile device res-
ident “Football Service” J2ME application. The con-
tent provided by the Web Service comprises match data
(team identities, current score, match duration, and
attendance), graphics (a png image file of a critical
match event, e.g. a goal) and a Rights Object control-
ling consumption of the service. The Web Service De-
ployment Descriptor and the WSDL of the simulated
football match service (MatchCentreService) are pre-
sented in appendices 2 and 3 respectively. In our test
model the graphic file was encrypted for confidential-
ity and the Rights Object (serviceConditions) ac-
companying the user content was used to convey con-
tent usage constraints; full details are provided in [7].
Invocation of the J2ME “Football Service” appli-
cation initiates mutual authentication concluding with
the creation of a high bandwidth secure channel be-
tween Server and SIM card as detailed in [8] and es-
tablishment of the shared secret IK. The Server is-
sues authentication and payment tokens, which are ex-
changed for the Web Service as described above. The
content associated with the service is provided to the
Mobile Operator using SOAP over http, and then se-
curely transferred to the Mobile Station for consump-
tion via the high bandwidth channel implemented by
the J2ME and Java Card Security Agent.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a scheme for au-
thentication and payment between a consumer and
a Web Service Provider that builds upon the Mobile
Operator relationship with the mobile subscriber. We
have considered the scheme protocol, and the struc-
ture and syntax of the payment and authentication to-
kens in detail. We recommend specific implementation
options that optimise performance between the con-
flicting requirements of interoperability and service la-
tency whilst providing security against external attack.
We have modelled our proposal with open source tools
based on a Java solution to supply a web service of a
simulated football match to a mobile consumer via a
Mobile Operator trusted third party.
To summarise, our proposal provides:
1. the user with a high level service discovery inter-
face plus anonymity from Web Service Providers;
2. the Mobile Operator with a pivotal role and a rev-
enue generating opportunity in the provision of a
web services security and payment platform;
3. the Content Provider with a secure, scalable dis-
tribution channel.
In conclusion, our proposal allows the traditional
Mobile Operator to leverage the breadth, innovation
and marketing diversity provided by the web services
developer community. By adopting such a dynamic,
flexible, services orientated architecture we encourage
Mobile Operators to rethink their current distribution
structures and business models for the sourcing and de-
livery of digital content to their mobile subscribers.
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A. Appendix 1
The representative syntax for a signed authenticated
Payment token Px is presented below. The syntax for
the simpler signed authentication token Sx is similar
but excludes the SignatureProperties element:
<Signature xmlns ="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig\#"
xmlns:app ="http://www.madgo.com/simple">
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>
<SignatureMethod Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig\#rsa-sha1"/>
<Reference URI="\#SAMLAssertion">
<DigestMethod Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/2000/07/xmldsig\#sha1"/>
<DigestValue>
(base 64 encoded sha1 hash of authentication token)
</DigestValue>
</Reference>
<Reference URI="\#PaymentAssertion"
Type="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig\#SignatureProperties">
<DigestMethod Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/2000/07/xmldsig\#sha1"/>
<DigestValue>
(base 64 encoded sha1 hash of payment token)
</DigestValue>
</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>
(base 64 encoded of rsa signature)
</SignatureValue>
<dsig:Object Id="SAMLAssertion" xmlns=""
xmlns:dsig ="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig\#">
<AuthenticationAssertion AssertionID="SAMLAssertion"
IssueInstant="(timestamp of authentication)"
Issuer="(authentication authority)"
xmnls="http://www.oasis-open.org/comittees/security/docs/
draft-sstc-schema-assertion-15.xsd">
<Subject>
<NameIdentifier>
<SecurityDomain>(Mobile Operator domain)</SecurityDomain>
<Name>(base 64 encoding of user ID)</Name>
</NameIdentifier>
</Subject>
</AuthenticationAssertion>
</dsig:Object>
<dsig:Object>
<dsig:SignatureProperties>
<dsig:SignatureProperty Id="PaymentAssertion">
<app:Payment>
<app:Supplier>(Web Service Provider URI)</app:Supplier>
<app:Sku>(Web Service Item Code)</app:Sku>
<app:Price>(Web Service Item Code Price)</app:Price>
</app:Payment>
</dsigSignatureProperty>
</dsig:SignatureProperties>
<dsig:Object>
</Signature>
B. Appendix 2
The Web Service Deployment Descriptor for the
proof of concept MatchCentreService implementation
is presented below:
<deployment xmlns="http://xml.apache.org/axis/wsdd/"
xmlns:java="http://xml.apache.org/axis/wsdd/providers/java">
<service name="MatchCentreService" style="rpc" use="encoded">
<parameter name="className" value="com.madgo.simple.MatchCentreImpl"/>
<parameter name="allowedMethods" value="*"/>
<wsdlFile>/MatchCentreService.wsdl</wsdlFile>
<beanMapping xmlns:ns="http://www.madgo.com/types/simple"
qname="ns:ServiceConditions"
languageSpecificType="java:com.madgo.simple.ServiceConditions"/>
<beanMapping xmlns:ns="http://www.madgo.com/types/simple"
qname="ns:CurrentScore"
languageSpecificType="java:com.madgo.simple.CurrentScore"/>
<beanMapping xmlns:ns="http://www.madgo.com/types/simple"
qname="ns:MatchException"
languageSpecificType="java:com.madgo.simple.MatchException"/>
</service>
</deployment>
C. Appendix 3
A collapsed version of the Web Service Descrip-
tion Language (WSDL) for the proof of concept
MatchCentreService implementation is presented be-
low:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?> - <wsdl:definitions
targetNamespace="http://www.madgo.com/wsdl/simple"
xmlns="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/"
xmlns:apachesoap="http://xml.apache.org/xml-soap"
xmlns:impl="http://www.madgo.com/wsdl/simple"
xmlns:intf="http://www.madgo.com/wsdl/simple"
xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"
xmlns:tns1="http://www.madgo.com/types/simple"
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/"
xmlns:wsdlsoap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
+ <wsdl:types>
+ <wsdl:message name="getAttendanceResponse">
+ <wsdl:message name="getAwayTeamResponse">
+ <wsdl:message name="getConditionsRequest">
+ <wsdl:message name="getConditionsResponse">
+ <wsdl:message name="getDurationResponse">
+ <wsdl:message name="getHomeTeamResponse">
+ <wsdl:message name="getScoreRequest">
+ <wsdl:message name="getImageResponse">
+ <wsdl:message name="getScoreResponse">
+ <wsdl:message name="getDurationRequest">
+ <wsdl:message name="getImageRequest">
+ <wsdl:message name="getAttendanceRequest">
+ <wsdl:message name="MatchException">
+ <wsdl:message name="getHomeTeamRequest">
+ <wsdl:message name="getAwayTeamRequest">
+ <wsdl:portType name="MatchCentre">
- <wsdl:binding name="MatchCentrePortSoapBinding"
type="impl:MatchCentre">
<wsdlsoap:binding style="rpc"
transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" />
+ <wsdl:operation name="getHomeTeam">
+ <wsdl:operation name="getAwayTeam">
+ <wsdl:operation name="getAttendance">
+ <wsdl:operation name="getDuration">
+ <wsdl:operation name="getScore">
+ <wsdl:operation name="getConditions">
+ <wsdl:operation name="getImage">
</wsdl:binding>
- <wsdl:service name="MatchCentreService">
- <wsdl:port
binding="impl:MatchCentrePortSoapBinding"
name="MatchCentrePort">
<wsdlsoap:address
location="http://localhost:8080/matchcentre/
services/MatchCentreService" />
</wsdl:port>
</wsdl:service>
</wsdl:definitions>
